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Myopic Loss Aversion Revisited: The Effect of 
Probability Distortions in Choice under Risk 
I.  Introduction 
Benartzi and Thaler [1995] proposed a new behavioral theory—myopic loss 
aversion (MLA) as an explanation for the equity premium puzzle [Mehra and Prescott, 
1985]. MLA combines two behavioral concepts—loss aversion and mental accounting. 
Loss aversion refers to the observation that the aggravation from losing a sum of money 
often exceeds the pleasure of gaining the same amount of money [Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979]. Mental accounting refers to the implicit methods that individuals use to 
evaluate the consequences of their decisions [Kahneman and Tversky, 1984]. The aspect 
of mental accounting that is important for MLA is how often individuals evaluate 
financial outcomes [Benartzi and Thaler, 1995]. When framing outcomes narrowly, an 
individual evaluates losses and gains more frequently [Thaler et al., 1997].  
For lotteries with positive expected value and a possibility of a loss, high 
frequency evaluation can lead to a greater dissatisfaction [Haigh and List, 2005]. When 
the performance of such lotteries is frequently assessed, the losses are more likely to be 
detected. Since the aggravation from losses exceeds the pleasure from gains, this leads to 
a greater dissatisfaction than when the same lotteries are evaluated infrequently. Thaler et 
al. [1997], Gneezy and Potters [1997], Gneezy et al. [2003] and Haigh and List [2005] 
provide experimental evidence supporting this implication of MLA. Individuals appear to 
invest significantly higher amounts in a risky lottery when its performance is assessed 
over a longer time period. 
This paper reexamines the experimental data documenting the presence of 
MLA. In particular, we take a closer look at the experimental results of Gneezy and 
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Potters [1997] and Haigh and List [2005], who generously provided their data. Gneezy 
and Potters [1997] as well as Haigh and List [2005] conducted a conventional laboratory 
experiment with a student subject pool. In addition, Haigh and List [2005] conducted an 
“artefactual field experiment” [Harrison and List, 2004] i.e. an experiment with a non-
standard subject pool (professional traders).  
In the experiments of Gneezy and Potters [1997] and Haigh and List [2005] the 
subjects are asked to invest a fraction of their initial endowment into a risky lottery. The 
majority of subjects invest some intermediate amount and only few subjects do not invest 
at all or invest their entire endowment. This result holds in the laboratory as well as in the 
field experimental setting and it also holds for both treatments: when the risky lottery is 
evaluated with high and low frequency.  
MLA alone cannot explain this observation. Since the initial endowment is 
small (around one U.S. dollar) the calibration theorem of Rabin [2000] can be invoked to 
argue that the utility function is linear (with a kink at the reference point to capture the 
loss aversion). An individual with such utility function invests an intermediate amount 
into a risky lottery if and only if he or she is exactly indifferent between investing and not 
investing. This allows us to identify the index of loss aversion [Köbberling and Wakker, 
2005] for the majority of subjects (who do not invest zero or 100% of their initial 
endowment). In the treatment, when lottery is evaluated with high frequency, the majority 
of subjects have a lower index of loss aversion than in the treatment, when lottery is 
evaluated with low frequency. However, this contradicts to the random assignment of 
subjects to both treatments. 
The above argument does not depend on the utility function being exactly 
piecewise linear. For example, it also holds true for the stylized value function of the 
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cumulative prospect theory [Tversky and Kahneman, 1992]. We demonstrate that the 
observed investment decisions can be rationalized if the subjects weight probabilities in a 
non-linear manner. Apparently, the effect of MLA is largely neutralized by a non-linear 
probability weighting in choice under risk. The probability of a loss is smaller when the 
lottery is evaluated infrequently. However, when individuals overweight small 
probabilities [Tversky and Kahneman, 1992], this can cause a greater dissatisfaction with 
the lottery. 
Langer and Weber [2005] recently demonstrated that the effect of MLA can be 
largely neutralized by the diminishing sensitivity to gains and losses, which is captured 
by the S-shaped value function of prospect theory. For specific lotteries with a low 
probability of a high loss (e.g. investment in a low rated junk bond), myopia does not 
decrease but increase the attractiveness of repeated investment. Langer and Weber [2005] 
support this conjecture with experimental evidence. They also take into account the effect 
of non-linear probability weighting. However, in contrast with this paper, Langer and 
Weber [2005] do not explore its interrelation with the effect of MLA for different 
parameterizations of probability weighting functions.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section 
reexamines the experimental results of Gneezy and Potters [1997] and Haigh and List 
[2005] and demonstrates that MLA alone cannot rationalize the observed investment 
decisions. Section III demonstrates that the experimental results can be explained by a 
combination of non-linear probability weighting and MLA, with the two effects working 
in the opposite directions. Section IV illustrates the effects of non-linear probability 
weighting and MLA using a famous example due to Samuelson [1963]. Section V 
concludes. 
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II.  Reexamination of Experimental Evidence 
Gneezy and Potters [1997] and Haigh and List [2005] use a nearly identical 
experimental design to test for the presence of MLA. In both experiments, the subjects 
choose how much of their initial endowment they want to invest in a risky lottery. If 
amount x is invested, the lottery yields –x with probability 2/3 and 2.5x with probability 
1/3. The subjects are randomly assigned to one of the two experimental treatments 
[Gneezy and Potters, 1997; Haigh and List, 2005]. In treatment H, the lottery is evaluated 
with high frequency. The subjects make investment decisions in 9 rounds. In rounds 2-9 
the subjects observe the outcome of the lottery realized in the previous round. In 
treatment L, the lottery is evaluated with low frequency. The subjects make investment 
decisions only in round " #7,4,1$t . The level of investment chosen in round t remains 
constant in rounds t, t+1 and t+2. In rounds 4 and 7 the subjects observe the cumulative 
outcome of the lottery realized in the previous three rounds. In both treatments the 
subjects receive a new initial endowment at the beginning of every period that does not 
depend on the cumulative earnings in the previous rounds. 
[Insert Table I and Table II here] 
Tables I and II classify the subjects in the experiments of Gneezy and Potters 
[1997] and Haigh and List [2005]. Classification is based on the investment decisions of 
the subjects. Table I summarizes investment decisions in treatment H. The majority of 
subjects invest an intermediate fraction (1%-99%) of their endowment. About 15% of 
subjects do not invest at all and about 15%-20% of subjects invest 100% of their 
endowment. Table II summarizes investment decisions in treatment L. The majority of 
subjects invest an intermediate fraction (1%-99%) of their endowment. There are no 
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subjects who abstain from investing. The percentage of subjects who invest 100% of their 
endowment does not exceed 36%. 
When we compare Tables I and II, the percentage of subjects who do not invest 
at all is higher when lottery is evaluated with high frequency. The percentage of subjects 
who invest their whole endowment is higher when lottery is evaluated with low 
frequency. These two observations are consistent with the hypothesis of MLA. However, 
MLA cannot explain the fact that the majority of subjects invest an intermediate fraction 
of their endowment in both treatments.  
The initial endowment in the experiment of Gneezy and Potters [1997] was 2 
Dutch guilders (around 1.2 U.S. dollar). The initial endowment in the experiment of 
Haigh and List [2005] was 1 U.S. dollar for students and 4 U.S. dollars for professional 
traders. For such small stakes the utility function over money can be assumed to be linear 
with a kink at zero to capture the effect of loss aversion [Benartzi and Thaler, 1995]. 
Rabin [2000] proves a calibration theorem that even a moderate curvature of the utility 
function over small stakes implies implausible risk aversion over large outcomes.  
Consider an individual with a piecewise linear utility function and the index of 
loss aversion 1%&  [Köbberling and Wakker, 2005]. The individual weighs losses 
relative to gains at a rate of &  and obtains utility ' ( 3225.13235.2 )*)+))*) && xxx  
from investing amount x into the risky lottery for one period. Therefore, in treatment H, 
the individual invests zero when 25.1%& , invests 100% of the initial endowment when 
25.1,&  and invests any fraction of the initial endowment when 25.1+&  i.e. when he or 
she is exactly indifferent between investing and not investing. Comparing this theoretical 
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prediction with the actual investment strategies summarized in Table I, we conclude that 
the majority of subjects in treatment H have the index of loss aversion 25.1+& . 
In treatment L, the individual evaluates the combined outcome of the lottery that 
is accumulated during three consecutive periods. The individual obtains utility 
' ( 9856.1278327125.02764275.7 )*)+)))*))-))-) && xxxxx  from investing 
amount x into the risky lottery for three periods. Therefore, in treatment L, the individual 
invests zero when 56.1%& , invests 100% of the initial endowment when 56.1,&  and 
invests any fraction of the initial endowment when 56.1+& . Comparing this theoretical 
prediction with the actual investment strategies summarized in Table II, we conclude that 
the majority of subjects in treatment L have the index of loss aversion 56.1+& . 
As usual in the experimental practice, the subjects have been assigned to both 
treatments in a random manner. Therefore, one can reasonably expect that the majority of 
subjects have the same index of loss aversion in both treatments. However, MLA implies 
that the majority of subjects have a higher index of loss aversion in treatment L. This 
paradoxical result does not depend on the utility function being precisely piecewise 
linear. Tversky and Kahneman [1992] argued that the utility function over monetary 
outcomes can be sufficiently accurately characterized by the functional form ' ( .xxu +  if 
0/x  and ' ( ' (0& xxu *)*+  if 0,x , where 1%&  is the index of loss aversion and 
88.0++ 0. . An individual with such utility function obtains utility 
' ( ' ( 3212.13235.2 88.0 )*)1))*) && 0. xxx  from investing amount x into the risky 
lottery for one period. The same individual obtains utility 
' ( ' ( ' ( ' ( ' ( 272156.1278327125.02764275.7 88.0 )*)1)))*))-))-) && .... xxxxx  
from investing amount x into the risky lottery for three periods. Thus, for Tversky and 
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Kahneman [1992] utility function, the majority of subjects must have the index of loss 
aversion 12.11&  in treatment H and 56.11&  in treatment L. Again, this is at odds with 
the random assignment of subjects to both treatments. 
Suppose that the majority of subjects in treatment L are indeed characterized by 
the index of loss aversion 56.1+& . If the subjects in treatment H have been recruited 
from the same population as the subjects in treatment L, the majority of them should also 
have the index of loss aversion 56.1+& . However, in this case the majority of subjects in 
treatment H should invest exactly zero in the risky lottery. We do not observe such 
behavior in the actual investment decisions (Table I). Similarly, if the majority of subjects 
in treatment H have the index of loss aversion 25.1+& , this should be also true for the 
majority of subjects in treatment L who are recruited from the same population. However, 
in this case the majority of subjects in treatment L should invest 100% of their 
endowment in the risky lottery. This is not what we observe in the actual investment 
strategies (Table II). To summarize, MLA does not explain how Tables I and II can be 
reconciled with each other.  
III.  The Role of Non-linear Probability Weighting 
An overwhelming empirical evidence suggests that individuals do not perceive 
probabilities linearly, when they choose between risky prospects [Bleichrodt and Pinto, 
2000; Abdellaoui, 2000]. Instead, individuals make decisions as if they overweight small 
probabilities (unlikely events) and underweight moderate and high probabilities 
[Kahneman and Tversky, 1979]. One way to model such non-linear probability 
distortions is through an inverse S-shaped probability weighting function of cumulative 
prospect theory [Tversky and Kahneman, 1992].  
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Non-linear probability weighting has immediate consequences for MLA. When 
risky asset is monitored with high frequency, the objective probability of detecting a loss 
is high. However, an individual underweighting high probabilities does not perceive the 
chance of a loss as high as its objective probability is. Hence, such an individual finds 
investing in the risky lottery more attractive (compared to an individual who does not 
distort probabilities). When risky asset is monitored with low frequency, the objective 
probability of detecting a loss is low. However, an individual overweighting low 
probabilities does not perceive the chance of a loss as low as its objective probability is. 
Hence, such an individual finds investing in the risky lottery less attractive. Obviously, 
non-linear probability weighting has an opposite effect to the one predicted by MLA. 
It is important to explore the implications of MLA when people distort 
probability information in a non-linear manner. We assume that an individual has a 
piecewise linear utility function ' ( xxu +  if 0/x  and ' ( xxu &+  if 0,x  [Thaler et al., 
1997]. The calibration theorem of Rabin [2000] can be invoked to justify this assumption. 
We model non-linear probability distortions through the probability weighting functions 
' ( ' (' ( 2222 11 ppppw *-+-  and ' ( ' (' ( 3333 11 ppppw *-+*  of cumulative prospect 
theory [Tversky and Kahneman, 1992]. The coefficients 2  and 3  must be positive and 
smaller than one to capture the overweighting of small probabilities and the under-
weighting of moderate and high probabilities. The case when 1++ 32  denotes the 
absence of probability distortions, which we have considered in the previous section. 
Consider again the risky lottery used in the experiments of Gneezy and Potters 
[1997] and Haigh and List [2005]. With non-linear probability weighting, an individual 
obtains utility ' ( ' (32315.2 *- ))*)) wxwx &  from investing amount x into the risky 
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lottery for one period. The individual is indifferent between investing and not investing if 
and only if his or her index of loss aversion is 
(1)     ' ( ' (32315.2 *-+ ww& . 
According to cumulative prospect theory, the same individual obtains utility 
' ( ' ( ' ( ' (278327195.02775.32715.3 *--- )))*))-))-)) wxwxwxwx &  from investing 
amount x into the risky lottery for three periods. In this case, the individual is indifferent 
between investing and not investing if and only if his or her index of loss aversion is 
(2)                    ' ( ' ( ' (' (2783
27195.02775.32715.3
*
--- --+
w
www
& . 
Tables I and II demonstrate that in the experiments of Gneezy and Potters 
[1997] and Haigh and List [2005] the majority of subjects invest an intermediate fraction 
(1%-99%) of their initial endowment into the risky lottery. Such behavior is observed both 
in treatment H and treatment L. The interpretation of this behavior is that the majority of 
subjects are exactly indifferent between investing and not investing in two treatments. 
Therefore, for the majority of subjects equations (1) and (2) should hold simultaneously.  
It turns out that for the typical parameterization of cumulative prospect theory 
equations (1) and (2) can indeed hold simultaneously. Probability weighting function for 
gains 4 5 4 51,01,0: 6-w  is characterized by one parameter ' (1,0$2 . Similarly, probability 
weighting function for losses 4 5 4 51,01,0: 6*w  is also characterized by one parameter 
' (1,0$3 . Therefore, for every value of 2  we can find a corresponding value of 3  (and 
vice versa) such that the right hand side of equations (1) equals to the right hand side of 
equation (2). This correspondence is presented on Figure I by a solid line with squares. 
The horizontal axis measures the probability weighing coefficient for gains 4 51,5.0$2 . 
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The vertical axis on the right hand side of Figure I measures the probability weighing 
coefficient for losses 3 . The points on the solid line with squares represent all pairs of 
coefficients ' (32 ,  such that if an individual is indifferent between investing and not 
investing in one period, he or she is also indifferent between investing and not investing 
in three periods.  
[Insert Figure I here] 
The solid line on Figure I shows the value of the index of loss aversion & , 
which is required to make an individual indifferent between investing and not investing 
(for a given 2 ). The index of loss aversion is measured on the vertical axis on the left 
hand side of Figure I. For example, consider an individual who has the probability 
weighing coefficient for gains 6.0+2 . This individual is indifferent between investing 
and not investing both in one period and in three periods if the probability weighing 
coefficient for losses is 5.0+3  and the index of loss aversion is 0.2+& . If 6.0+2 , 
5.0+3  and 0.2,& , the individual invests 100% of the initial endowment both in one 
and in three periods. If 6.0+2 , 5.0+3  and 0.2%& , the individual invests nothing both 
in one and in three periods. If 6.0+2 , 0.2+&  and 5.0%3  the individual invests 
nothing in one period and everything—in three periods (MLA effect prevails). If 6.0+2 , 
0.2+&  and 5.0,3  the individual invests everything in one period and nothing—in 
three periods (the effect of non-linear probability weighting prevails). 
When MLA is combined with non-linear probability weighting, we can explain 
the results documented in Tables I and II without assuming any differences in the index 
of loss aversion across two treatments. Apparently, the effect of MLA is largely 
neutralized by the overweighting of small probabilities and the underweighting of 
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moderate and high probabilities. Remarkably, for conventional parameterizations of 
cumulative prospect theory, the two effects exactly balance each other out. We already 
established that an individual with parameters 6.0+2 , 5.0+3  and 0.2+&  is exactly 
indifferent between investing and not investing both in treatment H and treatment L. 
These parameters are very close to the best-fitting parameters 61.0+2 , 69.0+3  and 
25.2+&  estimated by Tversky and Kahneman [1992] for cumulative prospect theory. 
This coincidence may explain why the majority of subjects happened to be exactly 
indifferent between investing and not investing both in treatment H and treatment L.  
In the analysis without probability distortions presented in the previous section, 
we concluded that the majority of subjects have the index of loss aversion 56.125.1 *+& . 
This estimate is lower than the conventional values of 5.20.2 *+&  found in numerous 
experiments [Kahneman et al., 1990]. When non-linear probability weighting is taken 
into account, the index of loss aversion inferred from the experiments on MLA is 
comparable to the conventional values found in other experiments. 
IV.  Samuelson’s example 
The effects of MLA and non-linear probability weighing are well illustrated by 
a famous example due to Samuelson [1963]. Samuelson offered a colleague to bet $200 
to $100 on a toss of a fair coin. The colleague rejected this lottery, but at the same time he 
was willing to accept 100 such bets. Samuelson [1963] proved a theorem that such a 
preference is inconsistent with expected utility maximization if a single lottery is rejected 
at every relevant wealth position. Benartzi and Thaler [1995] showed that the preference 
of Samuelson’s colleague is consistent with MLA. Kahneman and Lovallo [1993] 
presented a similar argument. In fact, Samuelson’s friend explained his preference with 
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the following rationale: “I won’t bet because I would feel the $100 loss more than the 
$200 gain. … But in a hundred tosses of a coin, … I am, so to speak, virtually sure to 
come out ahead in such a sequence, and this is why I accept the sequence while rejecting 
the single toss” [Samuelson, 1963].  
The explanation of Samuelson’s colleague is exactly the intuition behind the 
concept of loss aversion. A simple utility function that captures loss aversion is ' ( xxu +  
if 0/x  and ' ( xxu &+  if 0,x  [Benartzi and Thaler, 1995; Thaler et al., 1997]. Figure II 
demonstrates the minimum index of loss aversion &  that is required for an individual 
with this utility function to turn down a sequence of 4 5100,1$n  Samuelson’s lotteries. A 
solid line on Figure II demonstrates this minimum index of loss aversion (measured on 
the left vertical axis) when an individual does not distort probabilities. For example, an 
individual with the index of loss aversion 25.2+&  turns down the offer to bet on one 
toss but accepts the offer to bet on 4 5100,2$n  tosses of a fair coin. Since the solid line 
increases exponentially, very high loss aversion ( 32888+& ) is required to avert an 
individual from accepting a sequence of 100 Samuelson’s lotteries.  
The solid line with squares on Figure II demonstrates the minimum index of 
loss aversion (measured on the right vertical axis) that is required for an individual to turn 
down a sequence of 4 5100,1$n  Samuelson’s lotteries when he or she distorts probabilities 
in choice under risk. We model probability distortions by means of cumulative prospect 
theory with probability weighting functions ' ( ' (" #2ppw lnexp **+-  and 
' ( ' (" #3ppw lnexp **+*  proposed by Prelec [1998]. We do not use the functional form 
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of a probability weighting function proposed by Tversky and Kahneman [1992] because 
it is not monotone for low values of parameters 2  and 3 . 
The solid line with squares on Figure II is constructed for parameters 6.0+2  
and 1.0+3  (the situation without probability distortions corresponds to the case when 
1++ 32 ). When probabilities are perceived non-linearly, the effect of MLA can be 
reversed. For example, an individual with the index of loss aversion 25.2+&  accepts the 
offer to bet on one toss but turns down the offer to bet on 4 5100,2$n  tosses of a fair coin. 
This example directly contradicts to Langer and Weber [2005], who claim that such a 
preference is not possible for Samuelson’s lottery even if probability weighting is taken 
into account [Langer and Weber, 2005, p.29]. Apparently, the effect of MLA can be 
completely offset by the effect of probability distortions. In particular, Figure II 
demonstrates that the effect of MLA is dominated when an individual severely distorts 
the probability of losses. A coefficient 1.0+3  is close to zero, which implies that a 
probability weighting function for losses resembles a step function [Prelec, 1998]. 
Samuelson’s example can be also used to illustrate that, depending on the index 
of loss aversion and the curvature of probability weighting functions, the combined effect 
of MLA and probability distortions can become non-linear. For example, the solid line 
with squares on Figure II shows that an individual with the index of loss aversion 
85.1+&  ( 6.0+2  and 1.0+3  as before) accepts the offer to bet on 57n  and 60/n  
tosses of a fair coin. However, this individual rejects the sequence of 4 559,6$n  
Samuelson’s lotteries.  
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V.  Conclusion 
This paper uses the experimental data from Gneezy and Potters [1997] and 
Haigh and List [2005] to compare and contrast the impact of MLA in choice under risk 
with that of non-linear probability weighting. A close reexamination of the data suggests 
that myopic loss aversion cannot fully explain the experimental results. To do so, it is 
necessary to assume the systematic differences in the index of loss aversion of a modal 
subject across treatments with high and low evaluation frequencies. The paper shows that 
the distortions in probability weighting might significantly undermine the effects of 
MLA. Non-linear probability weighting in conjunction with MLA provides a complete 
explanation of experimental data. The paper extends the theoretical analysis of choice 
under risk by drawing a direct link between MLA and non-linear probability weighting, 
which can be further verified empirically.  
Benartzi and Thaler [1995] discovered that loss aversion is the main component 
of prospect theory that helps to explain the equity premium puzzle. When Benartzi and 
Thaler [1995] replaced non-linear probability weights with actual objective probabilities, 
the qualitative results of their simulations did not change. In particular, the length of the 
evaluation period, which is required to make investors indifferent between investing in 
bonds and stocks, has fallen from 11-12 month to 10 month. This change denotes a 
slightly increased effect of MLA. Therefore, in the simulations of Benartzi and Thaler 
[1995], non-linear probability weighting offsets only a fraction of the effect of MLA. We 
demonstrate that this conclusion does not apply to the experimental results of Gneezy and 
Potters [1997] and Haigh and List [2005]. In particular, we find that the effect of non-
linear probability weighting exactly counterbalances the effect of MLA for conventional 
parameterizations of cumulative prospect theory. It remains to further research to 
 16
investigate what drives this difference in results between macroeconomic simulations and 
microeconomic experiments. 
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Table I   Classification of Subjects according to Investment  
Strategy in Treatment H 
 
Percentage of subjects 
Classification of subjects according to 
investment strategy 
Gneezy and 
Potters 
[1997] 
Haigh and 
List [2005], 
students 
Haigh and 
List [2005], 
professional 
traders 
Invest 100% of endowment in all rounds 12.2 % 6.3 % 11.1 % 
Invest 100% of endowment in the majority 
of rounds (!5 rounds) 4.9 % 9.4 % 11.1 % 
Invest 1%-99% of endowment in all rounds 43.9 % 53.1 % 25.9 % 
Invest 1%-99% of endowment in the 
majority of rounds (!5 rounds) 21.9 % 25.0 % 37.1 % 
Invest 0% of endowment in all rounds 0.0 % 3.1 % 0.0 % 
Invest 0% of endowment in the majority of 
rounds (!5 rounds) 9.8 % 0.0 % 7.4 % 
Other 7.3 % 3.1 % 7.4 % 
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Table II   Classification of Subjects according to Investment  
Strategy in Treatment L 
Percentage of subjects 
Classification of subjects according to 
investment strategy 
Gneezy and 
Potters 
[1997] 
Haigh and 
List [2005], 
students 
Haigh and 
List [2005], 
professional 
traders 
Invest 100% of endowment in all rounds 33.3 %  12.5 % 25.9 % 
Invest 100% of endowment in the majority 
of rounds (!5 rounds) 2.4 % 6.3 % 11.1 % 
Invest 1%-99% of endowment in all rounds 45.2 % 65.6 % 51.9 % 
Invest 1%-99% of endowment in the 
majority of rounds (!5 rounds) 19.1 % 15.6 % 11.1 % 
Invest 0% of endowment in all rounds 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 
Invest 0% of endowment in the majority of 
rounds (!5 rounds) 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 
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Figure I  Parameterization of cumulative prospect theory, when an individual is  
indifferent between investing and not investing both in treatment H and treatment L 
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Figure II Minimum index of loss aversion that is required for an individual 
to turn down a sequence of Samuelson’s lotteries   
